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POLICY EVALUATION AND EMPIRICAL
GROWTH RESEARCH
Steven N. Durlauf
University of Wisconsin at Madison
This paper explores the implications of the vast body of studies of
cross-country growth determinants for the evaluation of alternative
policies. Empirical growth studies have experienced a remarkable flow-
ering in the last fifteen years, and innumerable insights have unques-
tionably been uncovered concerning similarities and differences in the
growth experiences of various groups of countries. This empirical work
was stimulated by—and, in turn, has been an essential complement
to—the revival of growth theory initiated by the seminal papers of Lucas
(1988) and Romer (1986). It constitutes one of the great successes of
recent macroeconomic research.
In addition to identifying empirical regularities in growth, the empiri-
cal literature makes numerous claims concerning the impacts of alterna-
tive policies on the growth trajectories of different countries. This focus on
policy implications is natural given the huge welfare implications of changes
in a country’s growth rate. A recent graduate-level textbook remarks
“If large cross-sections of country experiences are interesting, it should
mainly be because they ought to reveal the global impact of other
growth determinants than the proximate factors of increases in pro-
ductivity, factors about which we have other sources of evidence. Policy-
oriented macroeconomists pay particular attention to the various com-
ponents of government interventions” (Malinvaud, 1998, p. 781).
Durlauf and Quah (1999) survey the empirical growth literature
and identify an enormous number of policy variables whose growth
implications are analyzed in the new empirical literature. Among these
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variables are government consumption (Barro, 1991), inflation (Barro,
1997), political instability (Alesina and others, 1996), civil liberties
(Kormendi and Meguire 1985), financial repression (Easterly, 1993),
tariffs (Lee, 1993), and trade openness (Harrison, 1995). And this list
does not include variables such as human capital, for which the
government’s role is fundamental.
The argument of this paper, however, is that this empirical litera-
ture largely fails from the perspective of policy evaluation. Current
econometric practice has yielded a body of evidence that is not policy
relevant, in that a policymaker cannot readily translate the findings of
the literature into implications for the evaluation of alternative policy
trajectories. In making this argument, I focus on cross-country growth
regressions of the type pioneered by Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Barro
(1991), and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). While this style of em-
pirical research does not exhaust the ways in which data have been
brought to bear on growth questions, it does constitute the primary
approach to empirical work in this literature. Furthermore, cross-coun-
try growth regressions have become a conventional mechanism through
which policy recommendations are justified.
In what sense are cross-country growth regressions not policy rel-
evant? I focus on two issues. First, when these regressions are used to
make policy recommendations, the recommendations typically are based
on the statistical significance of some regression coefficient. I argue
that this way of using regressions does not have a natural decision-
theoretic basis, because there is no simple relationship between statis-
tical significance levels and policy evaluation. Second, growth regres-
sions as conventionally constructed do not provide credible evidence of
economic structure, so even if one is trying to use the regressions to
solve a decision theory problem, it is unclear what information the
regression actually contains.
It would be a gross caricature of the policymaking process to claim
that there is a mechanical mapping from the statistical significance of
certain regression parameters to specific policy decisions. The argu-
ments in this essay apply more to the ways in which statistical evi-
dence on growth are used for policy discussions among scholars. The
two processes are, of course, linked. This essay describes more effective
ways of translating statistical results into policy advice, so as to
strengthen the contributions of academic discourse to policymaking.
My analysis is hardly the first critique of the empirical growth
literature. Criticisms of the ways in which growth regressions are imple-
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to analyzing growth data, may be found in Brock and Durlauf (2001),
Durlauf (2000), Quah (1996, 1997), and Temple (2000), to name a few
examples. The discussion here, of course, relies on my previous work,
especially for technical justification and the development of the various
arguments. In particular, much of the discussion represents an exten-
sion of Brock and Durlauf (2001). Relative to other critiques of growth
empirics, my focus is on the specific failings of cross-county growth
regressions in providing policy guidance. Nevertheless, many of the
criticisms I make call into question not only whether evidence from
growth regressions is actually informative for policy, but whether such
regressions provide structural information on the sources of growth. I
do not question the value of the empirical growth literature in terms of
identifying stylized facts that theoretical models should address. Rather,
the empirical growth literature fails when it moves in an insouciant
fashion from stylized facts to causal claims.
I do not intend to be wholly nihilistic in this paper, and it is cer-
tainly not my belief that growth regressions have no place in the evalu-
ation of policies. My goal is to highlight why claims based on such
regressions should be modest. I also discuss some recent developments
in statistics that I believe can enhance the utility of these regressions.
In doing so, I strongly endorse two recent papers, Doppelhofer, Miller,
and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b). My
own previous work in Brock and Durlauf (2001) develops many of the
arguments here at more length and constitutes a more formal state-
ment of my views on how to conduct empirical growth analyses.
Section 1 discusses the basic question of growth regressions and
policy evaluation, arguing that the appropriate link between the two
processes is not reflected in conventional academic practice. What em-
pirical work on growth should do is provide posterior densities for growth
rates under alternative policy scenarios. I argue that the exercise of
policy evaluation depends on these posterior densities, combined with
an explicit statement of a policymaker’s objectives. Section 2 then ad-
dresses why conventional approaches to growth econometrics do not
provide credible estimates of the posterior densities needed for the type
of policy evaluation exercise I advocate. The section argues that growth
regressions suffer two basic problems: theory uncertainty and country
heterogeneity. These problems have not been adequately addressed in
the empirical growth studies. Section 3 describes a technique, Baye-
sian model averaging, that addresses the problems raised in section 2.
Section 4 presents an empirical exercise to illustrate how Bayesian
model averaging can influence the way one thinks about the effects of166 Steven N. Durlauf
policies in light of empirical results. Finally, section 5 provides a sum-
mary and conclusions.
1. REGRESSIONS AND POLICY ANALYSIS
This section describes the basics of growth regressions and sug-
gests a general language for thinking about how regressions should
influence policy evaluations. While growth regressions come in many
forms, a canonical representation is
iiiii gXZp =b+g+d+e , (1)
where gi is real per capita growth across some fixed time interval, Xi is
a set of regressors suggested by the Solow growth model (population
growth, technological change, physical and human capital, and sav-
ings rates, transformed in ways implied by the model), Zi is a set of
additional control variables suggested by new growth theories, pi is the
policy variable of interest, and ei is an error. The distinction between Xi
and Zi is important in econometric practice, because while Xi variables
are essentially constant across empirical studies, there is no consensus
on which Zi variables should be included. Many growth studies use
panel rather than cross-section data, but this difference has relatively
little bearing on issues of interpretation and so is ignored here.1
What does it mean to use this type of regression to evaluate a policy?
A policymaker presumably wishes to compare the effects of setting a
policy variable at some fixed level, p, with the effects of an alternative
setting, p. Supposing that the policymaker has a payoff function,
( ) ,, iii VyRp, (2)
then the policy problem is essentially a comparison of the payoffs asso-
ciated with the alternative policies. If the policymaker has a payoff
function, V, the policy evaluation amounts to computing
( ) ( ) - ,,,, iiii EVyRpDEVyRpD . (3)
1. My argument is not intended to dismiss the utility of panels in studying
growth across countries, but rather focuses on issues that apply in both cross-
section and panel contexts. For example, while panels allow the elimination of
fixed effects that correspond to constant differences in growth rates across coun-
tries, they do not provide any natural solution to the more general issue of param-
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In this representation, E is an expected value operator, yi repre-
sents per capita income in country i, Ri represents some set of charac-
teristics of country i that affect the policymaker’s assessments, and D
denotes all data available to the policymaker. I have written the payoff
function in terms of levels of per capita output, but if lagged per capita
output is part of Ri, then this function can accommodate the case in
which the growth rate is the relevant argument in the payoff function
for the policymaker.
With regard to policy analysis, the key question is simple. How one
can use regressions of the form in equation 1 to inform calculations of
equation 3? This question is hardly an unusual one; indeed it is pre-
cisely this type of question that underlies the development of statistical
decision theory, beginning with the seminal work of Abraham Wald
(1950). From the Wald perspective, one evaluates a policy by calculat-
ing equation 3, using equation 1 to compute the conditional expecta-
tions that are a part of this calculation. Put differently, the relevance
of equation 1 for policy analysis is that it allows for the computation of
the distribution of growth rates under alternative choices of the policy
variable, pi. These distributions matter only in how they affect the
expected payoff of the policymaker.
Surprisingly, this is not how policy implications are usually drawn
from growth regressions. Instead, policy evaluations are drawn as an
implication of hypothesis tests made on the coefficient associated with
the policy variable of interest. In the context of equation 1, this amounts
to using the statistical significance of d in equation 1 to determine
whether one can recommend a change in the magnitude of pi to en-
hance growth in country i. A good example of this approach is the
assessment of alternative policy variables in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995, chap. 12). In this survey of the empirical growth literature, the
empirical evaluation of various policy variables in the growth process
is virtually always related to statistical significance, typically assessed
at the 5 percent level. (Significance at 10 percent but not 5 percent is
apparently considered to be sufficiently weak evidence that a variable
can be ignored.)
There is a vast statistical literature debating the use of statistical
significance levels in evaluating statistical models; much of this debate
revolves around frequentist versus Bayesian approaches to statistical
analysis. My concern is somewhat different. The question is whether
the statistical significance of a variable provides much insight into cal-
culations of equation 3. As the form of equation 3 makes clear, the
general answer is no. In order for there to be such a relationship, the168 Steven N. Durlauf
payoff function would have to possess a functional form such that the
implied policy recommendation would be, “implement the policy if the co-
efficient on the policy variable is statistically significant; otherwise do not
implement the policy.” Suppose that the question is whether to move
from pto p. Assume that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of d,
d ˆ,can be interpreted as its expected value and that the OLS variance of
the parameter estimate of d is the variance of the parameter. (The condi-
tions under which these assumptions hold are discussed below.) Finally,
assume that the “statistical significance” rule is that one should only imple-
ment a policy change if the t statistic for the policy coefficient is greater
than or equal to 2 and the sign of the policy change is the same as the
coefficient estimate. Then, for the payoff function implicitly defined by








Øø d ºß , (4)
one would only increase the policy variable from pto pif the t statistic
in the OLS regression is at least equal to 2 and the sign of the coeffi-
cient is positive. (The use of 2 versus some other value is immaterial.)
This is a very special case and embodies several unintuitive as-
sumptions. First, the policymaker must only care about the compo-
nent of growth affected by the control variable, rather than the effect of
the control variable on growth per se. In other words, the policymaker
considers the effect of the policy in isolation from all other determi-
nants of growth. Second, the policymaker must only care about the
mean and variance of the policy’s effect on growth. While I do not wish
to speculate on the objective functions employed in practice by
policymakers, this function would seem inappropriate in many con-
texts. For example, political stability issues might render a policymaker
more sensitive to negative growth rates than to positive growth rates,
or there might be asymmetries in the effects of growth on poverty that
should be accounted for in the social evaluation of changes in growth
rates. Third, the mean and standard deviation of the growth effect in
the payoff function must present a 2-to-1 tradeoff. This is where the
significance level for the t statistic is implicitly embedded in the payoff
function. The point, of course, is that there is no reason to expect any of
these assumptions to hold in practice.
Is there a straightforward way to reduce the gap between the sta-
tistical decision theory approach to evaluating growth regressions and
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sage of the statistical decision theory literature is that no simple link
exists. As demonstrated quite clearly in Chamberlain (2000), decision
theory imposes powerful restrictions on how one analyzes data. Hence,
one message for policymakers who must evaluate growth policies is
that what they should ultimately care about is the posterior density of
growth rates (or income levels) under alternative policy scenarios.
I therefore turn to a second question, namely, the interpretation
of the posterior density of parameters in growth regressions. In inter-
preting the goal of an empirical exercise as the computation of a pos-
terior density, I use Bayesian as opposed to frequentist language. This
distinction is unimportant for the subsequent discussion, as the cri-
tiques I make of conventional growth regressions concern their inter-
pretability, an issue that is equally salient under Bayesian and
frequentist paradigms. Bayesian language is more appropriate in my
discussion, however, because Bayesian approaches can be integrated
much more naturally into decision-theoretic analyses than can
frequentist approaches.
2. INTERPRETING GROWTH REGRESSIONS
The previous section illustrates why the conventional use of growth
regressions for policy analysis has no logical justification. These re-
gressions, nevertheless, do contain information about the growth pro-
cess and its relationship to particular policy variables. In this section,
I explore reasons why the regressions themselves are difficult to inter-
pret in policy contexts.
The use of growth regressions to inform policy analyses is based on
interpretations of these regressions as structural relationships. Put
differently, these analyses presuppose that the observed correlations
on which these regressions are computed can be interpreted as some-
thing more. Whether interpretations of the type found in this litera-
ture are justifiable is not entirely clear, for two main reasons:
openendedness of the theories and parameter heterogeneity.
2.1 Openendedness and the Structure of Growth
Theories
A first problem in specifying empirical growth models concerns the
identification of the growth determinants to be included in a statistical
model. This problem arises in any statistical analysis, but the danger
is especially problematic in growth contexts. As originally argued in170 Steven N. Durlauf
Durlauf (2000), modern growth theories are fundamentally openended:
one growth theory typically has no bearing on the empirical relevance
of another. Modern growth economics has put forward an enormous
range of alternative explanations for cross-country growth differences.
Hence, one paper focuses on the effects of inequality on growth (Persson
and Tabellini, 1994), another on the role of social capital (Knack and
Keefer, 1997), another on geography, (Sala-i-Martin, 1997), and so on.
What is critical in assessing individual empirical exercises is that these
alternative explanations are both not mutually exclusive and often per-
fectly compatible. There is nothing in the logic of a theory linking so-
cial capital to growth that is inconsistent with a theory linking trade
openness to growth, even though there may be interrelationships be-
tween the two theories.
How large is the set of growth theories that have been taken to data?
Durlauf and Quah (1999) survey the empirical literature and note that
as of 1998, at least as many ex ante plausible regressors have been used
to proxy for growth theories as there are countries in the standard growth
dataset. My own reading of the literature suggests that the number of
potential variables has grown substantially since then.2
Openendedness has several critical implications for the interpreta-
tion of growth regressions. First, since the mutual compatibility of al-
ternative growth theories in no way implies that they are uncorrelated
(when their empirical analogues are compared across countries), the
danger of omitted variable bias in a given cross-country regression is
immense. Furthermore, the large number of growth variables means
that one cannot simply run a regression with all theories, but rather
must employ an empirical strategy for variable selection.
A number of studies make an effort to engage in variable selection
in growth contexts and thereby deal with the dangers of misspecification.
Levine and Renelt (1992) employ Edward Leamer’s celebrated extreme
bounds analysis to determine which variables can be robustly related
to growth. This amounts to running a large set of regressions, each of
which contains some subset of the potential regressors used for growth
theories, and seeing how the sign of a given regressor changes accord-
ing to what other regressors are included. When this sign is stable
across alternative regressions, the regressor is considered to have a
robust relationship. Sala-i-Martin (1997) employs a related procedure,
but he interprets a regressor as robust if it is statistically significant in
2. I also believe that our 1999 survey seriously underestimates the number of
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95 percent of the regressions in which it is included. Each of these is an
important paper. Neither can be said to provide a satisfactory resolu-
tion of the problem of variable selection, however, because neither ap-
proach has a fully satisfactory decision-theoretic foundation. Extreme
bounds analysis implies that a policy variable is unimportant if it is
not constant for a large number of regressions, although that sort of
instability might well occur even if there is a relationship between the
variable and growth. Furthermore, Levine and Renelt (1992) treat all
regressions as equally informative, whereas standard metrics such as
goodness of fit suggest they may not be. Similar criticisms may be
made of Sala-i-Martin (1997). Brock and Durlauf (2001) provide some
ways to think about decision-theoretic approaches to variable selection
and discuss approaches that appear in the econometrics literature. For
my purposes, however, the key point is that the proposed solutions to
variable selection do not reflect the attention to decision-theoretic foun-
dations needed to make the procedures wholly compelling. What I pro-
pose below incorporates the important insights of these techniques, but
in a way that is more compatible with policy analysis.
Second, openendedness implies that it is extremely difficult to
use instrumental variables in growth contexts. In regression 1, sup-
pose one is worried that the policy variable, pi, is endogenous. How
can one construct an instrument for it? To be valid, the instrument
must be predetermined with respect to pi; this is the basis on which
instruments are typically used in the growth literature. Validity
also requires that a second condition be fulfilled: namely, that the
instrument is uncorrelated with ei. And what is ei? This is the unob-
served variable that captures all growth determinants that have not
been modeled in the regression. Hence, to argue that the instru-
ment is valid, one has to argue that it is uncorrelated with all theo-
ries not embodied by the regression, a condition that seems virtu-
ally impossible to satisfy.
Theory openendedness makes clear how prior information is an
inevitable part of the interpretation of growth regressions and thus of
their use in policy analysis. To interpret a particular regression of
the form of equation 1 as revealing economic structure, it is neces-
sary to believe something about the errors. As noted above, these er-
rors embody growth determinants that have been neglected by the
regression. The analyst must be able to interpret the parameter esti-
mates despite the presence of these omitted variables. One’s under-
standing of these omitted variables, however, reflects one’s knowl-
edge of the histories and societies of the various countries in the172 Steven N. Durlauf
dataset. Such prior information often comes from qualitative and de-
scriptive sources. The fact that these sources are not quantitative does
not allow the analyst to ignore them.
2.2 Heterogeneity
A second issue in interpreting growth regressions concerns hetero-
geneity in countries. Put in its simplest form, the use of a regression
such as equation 1 for policy analysis presupposes the belief that the
growth process for different countries can be well approximated as a
country-invariant relationship. Again, invariance of parameters across
observations is an assumption that is certainly not unique to growth
contexts, yet it seems particularly difficult to defend such an assump-
tion in growth contexts. Consider the claim that a measure of the tariff
level affects growth. Does one interpret the tariff coefficient in equation
1 as saying that the effects of a change in tariffs for the United States
is the same as for Belgium and for Singapore? Does one believe that the
growth implications of a unit change in human capital are the same for
the United States as for countries in sub-Saharan Africa? Presumably
not, but this is precisely what is asserted when one uses regressions
such as equation 1 to uncover growth determinants.
Concerns about parameter heterogeneity are of more than theoreti-
cal interest. Studies such as Canova (1999), Desdoigts (1999), Durlauf
and Johnson (1995), Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin (2001), and
Kourtellos (2000) all provide evidence of parameter heterogeneity. Taken
as a whole, the evidence clearly suggests that the standard approach to
assuming country-invariant parameters as the null modeling assump-
tion in growth regressions is inconsistent with the data. This practice
is still quite general, however, and most exceptions to this generaliza-
tion amount to nothing more than ad hoc additions of cross products of
growth variables with thresholds (for example, a variable that is zero
for countries below some measure of income, 1 otherwise.) It is thus no
exaggeration to say that parameter heterogeneity has yet to become a
primary component of growth models.
From the perspective of evaluating growth policies, the implica-
tions of parameter heterogeneity are clear. Policy advice is not given in
terms of average effects in the world. One would not say, “Since the
average effect of tariffs on growth for all countries is negative, country
i should lower tariffs.” Yet this is essentially what occurs when one
neglects heterogeneity in the growth process and uses the coefficient
estimates in equation 1 as the basis for advising a particular country.173 Policy Evaluation and Empirical Growth Research
Large deviations between the growth effect of a variable as estimated
in a regression such as equation 1 and the effect for a particular coun-
try can easily occur when parameters are heterogeneous; there is no
guarantee that the signs are even the same. Hence, neglected param-
eter heterogeneity can lead to bad policy advice.
3. BAYESIAN MODEL AVERAGING AND GROWTH REGRESSIONS
This section describes a new approach to the analysis of growth
regressions that has the potential for making inferences on growth
regressions more credible. This technique is known as Bayesian model
averaging (BMA). It has been developed by Adrian Raftery and a series
of coauthors (Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting, 1997; Hoeting, and oth-
ers, 1999). Wasserman (2000) provides a very clear introduction to model
averaging. Much of the motivation for the work can be traced to the
issues of model uncertainty analyzed by Leamer (1978), a book whose
importance to econometric practice has yet to be fully appreciated. Ap-
plications of BMA to growth regressions may be found in Brock and
Durlauf (2001), Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2000), and
Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b). While these papers differ in many
details, each is motivated by similar concerns.
3.1 Basic Ideas
The basic idea of Bayesian model averaging is the following. Sup-
pose that one is concerned with a parameter, in my case d, that is an
element of a model. Unlike conventional practice, however, suppose
that one does not know the true model of which the parameter is an
element. Instead, one has a set of models M, with a typical element
Mm, which for the sake of exposition contains the true model. (If an
element of the model set does not contain the parameter d, it is inter-
preted as meaning d = 0).
Conventional econometric practice amounts to computing
m(d‰D, Mm), that is, one evaluates the probability density of the param-
eter d given the available data D and the assumption that the data are
generated by a particular model Mm.3 In contrast, Bayesian model av-
eraging advocates computing the conditional probability of the pa-
rameter given only the data, that is, m(d‰D). This computation basi-
3. I sometimes refer to conditional probabilities as posterior probabilities, in
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cally eliminates the dependence of m(d‰D, Mm) on Mm by integrating out
this additional conditioning variable. Since the number of models is
discrete, this amounts to computing
( ) ( ) ( ) , mm
m
DDMMD md=mdm ￿ . (5)
Using Bayes rule, this expression may be rewritten as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , mmm
m
DDMDMM md=mdmm ￿ , (6)
which provides some insight into the difference between the BMA ap-
proach and conventional practice. Rather than condition on a single
Mm in computing the posterior density, the BMA approach takes the
posterior density m(d‰D, Mm) for each model and computes a particular
weighted average. The weights assigned to each model consist of two
components: m(Mm), which is the prior probability assigned to a given
model, and m(D‰Mm), which is the posterior probability of the data given
a particular model. The latter term is nothing more than the likelihood
function.
One can compute the posterior mean and variance of the parameter
d using these formulas. As originally shown in Leamer (1978), these are
( ) ( ) ( ) , mm
m
EDMDEDM d=md ￿ and (7)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( )
( ) ( )
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These formulas illustrate how model uncertainty affects a given pa-
rameter estimate. First, the posterior mean of the parameter is a weighted
average of the posterior means across each model. Second, the posterior
variance is the sum of two terms. The first term is a weighted average of
the variances for each model. The second term reflects the variance across
models of the expected value for d; these differences reflect the fact that
the models are themselves different. This second variance term captures
how model uncertainty increases the variance associated with a param-
eter estimate relative to conventional calculations.4
3.2 Regression
From the perspective of a regression, model uncertainty is a func-
tion of what regressors to include. Both theory openendedness and
country heterogeneity may be interpreted in this context. To see
this, suppose that we have a set of R possible alternative determi-
nants of growth. Theory openendedness means that the researcher
does not have a basis for excluding one of the potential theories be-
cause another one matters. From the perspective of R, a regression
that includes any subset of its elements constitutes a possible growth
model. Hence, if there are K different regressors in R, then 2K–1
different possible models exist.
One can also interpret a range of possible forms of country heteroge-
neity in terms of variable inclusion in the same way I have interpreted
theory uncertainty. Suppose that the countries in a growth cross section
can be grouped into two distinct classes, such that countries within a
class obey the same linear growth model. Let A1 and A2 denote the collec-
tions of country indices corresponding to these classes. The assumption
of two classes means that there are two growth models for the data.
=b+g+d+e˛ 1 if iiiii gXZpiA  and (9)
2 if iiiii gXZpiA ¢¢¢ =b+g+d+e˛ . (10)
Equation 10 can be rewritten, however, as
( )








¢¢ +gg+dd+e˛ . (11)
4. See Draper (1995) for additional discussion.176 Steven N. Durlauf
Therefore, one can combine the data from both classes of countries into
a single regression
( )













where xi,A2 if i ˛ A2, 0 otherwise. As this regression indicates, the pres-
ence of multiple classes of countries may be captured by introducing
additional regressors, Xi xi,A2, Zi xi,A2, and pi xi,A2. It is straightforward to
generalize this argument to multiple classes.
This approach is not completely general, in that it requires some
prior judgments about what possible groups of countries will be consid-
ered. If one allows each country to have its own parameters, then one
will not have enough degrees of freedom to estimate the model. I am
currently unaware of any way to generalize BMA procedures to allow
for endogenous determination of groups of countries with similar pa-
rameters. Such techniques could be developed, however. For example,
regression tree methods of the type employed by Durlauf and Johnson
(1995) to allow the data to reveal groups of similar countries could per-
haps be incorporated into a BMA framework. This is a fruitful area for
future research.
An alternative to this approach to parameter heterogeneity is to
model the parameters of a growth regression as functions of country-
specific characteristics. This would allow each country to be associated
with a unique set of regression coefficients. See Durlauf, Kourtellos,
and Minkin (2001) for an example of this approach. Both the approach
here and the methods in Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin (2001) can
address issues of nonlinearities in the growth process; the differences
between the approaches concerns how one approximates an unknown
nonlinearity. The approach here has some advantage when one thinks
that threshold effects are present, as suggested by models such as
Azariadis and Drazen (1990); Galor (1996) provides additional discus-
sion of issues related to nonlinearities in theory and empirical practice.
3.3 Implementation
To implement the BMA procedure, it is necessary to characterize
m(D‰Mm) and m(Mm). The former essentially requires the specification
of two things: the prior distribution on the coefficients and the prob-
ability density for the residuals within a given model. I do this as177 Policy Evaluation and Empirical Growth Research
5. Compare the approach in Box and Tiao (1973, p. 115).
follows. For a given regression, let Si denote the regressor associated
with country i. A growth regression will therefore have the form
1,..., iii gSiI =z+e=. (13)
To compute the posterior distribution of z, I assume, first, that I have
no informative prior information on the coefficients. In more standard
language, I impose a noninformative prior on the coefficients, that is,
( ) c mz￿ . (14)
Second, I assume that the errors are i.i.d. normal with a known vari-
ance. Under this assumption, one can show that the posterior density
of the regression coefficients is
( ) ( )
–1 2 ˆ ~, DNSS e Øø ¢ mzzs Œœ ºß , (15)
where ˆ z is the OLS estimate of the parameters in equation 13.5 Notice
that( )
–1 2 SS e ¢ s  is the OLS variance estimate for the parameters when
the error variance is known. What is very useful about this formula is
that it means that the parameters of the posterior density of z have OLS
interpretations. The assumption that the error variance is known is not
serious; the formula will still be valid asymptotically if
2
e s  is replaced
with its OLS estimate.
The choice of m(Mm) is more problematic, in that it corresponds to
the prior information a researcher has about which model is true. At
first glance, it might seem that if one does not have such information,
one should assign equal prior weight to each element of M. This is not
entirely satisfactory, however. Assigning equal probabilities to each
model is equivalent to assuming that the prior probability of including
a given regressor is 0.5 and is independent of the presence or absence of
any other regressor. This is clearly untenable given the economics of
growth. Presumably, the fact that inequality affects growth says some-
thing about whether political institutions affect growth. This observa-
tion is consistent with the problem of theory openendedness discussed
earlier: mutual compatibility does not entail independence.
As yet, there has been no satisfactory proposal to deal with this
problem. For the purposes of this paper, I employ the equal prior model178 Steven N. Durlauf
probability assumption. I do so, however, to allow for a simple interpre-
tation of my results, not because it is intrinsically appealing. The de-
velopment of better priors is an important outstanding research ques-
tion. The approach I follow is in the spirit of the benchmark approach
to choosing priors, which emphasizes the idea that priors should facili-
tate comparisons across studies. In this regard, Fernandez, Ley, and
Steel (2001a) develop a number of priors for model averaging contexts
that have desirable properties. Another approach is to use prior eco-
nomic reasoning to structure priors. As argued in Brock and Durlauf
(2001), the problem of interdependences in variables is analogous to
violations of the assumption in discrete choice theory of the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. This problem led to the development of
models such as the nested logit; I conjecture that a similar tree struc-
ture may exist to organize growth regressors. Yet another possibility is
the use of panel data as a training sample to form priors for the analy-
sis of the rest of the sample. While this has yet to be done in the cases
of variable selection, work such as that by Berger and Peracchi (2001,
2002) shows that this is a promising approach in other contexts.
4. EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, I describe a small BMA exercise in exploring the
role of three different policy variables in growth. The exercise does not
attempt to explore a large class of alternative theories, as would be
ideal in analyses of this type and as is done in the important papers by
Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Fernandez, Ley, and
Steel (2001b). Rather, my intent is to illustrate how attention to model
uncertainty can affect one’s views of a regression.
My analysis focuses on a particular growth regression studied in
an influential paper by Easterly and Levine (1997). I use their baseline
regression, which is conducted on panel data constructed of ten-year
moving averages for the decades 1960 to 1990.6 Working with a
baseline growth regression suggested by that paper, I consider vari-
ous model averaging generalizations. Specifically, I focus on three
policy variables that have received attention in the growth litera-
ture: a measure of the size of government deficits (SURP), a measure
of human capital (SCHOOLING), and a measure of democracy (DE-
MOCRACY). One could plausibly argue that these are not control
6. Data definitions are provided in the appendix A below. See Easterly and
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variables with respect to any policymaker and should themselves be
modeled as endogenous outcomes influenced by a policymaker, but
this does not mitigate against the value of the exercise. (See the
appendix B for estimation details.)
Six different regressions are run for each of these variables. First,
I report an OLS growth regression that includes only the policy vari-
able of interest. The regressor set referred to as ALL corresponds to
the list of regressors in the first column of table 1. Second, I report
a Bayesian model averaging exercise taken over all variables in the
original model. Third, I report an ordinary least squares regression
that allows for the coefficients on the Latin American countries to
differ from the rest of the sample. The term LATINCA in the table
refers to regressors that are set equal to zero for countries outside of
Latin America. Fourth, I report the BMA analog to this regression.
In the third and fourth cases, the regression coefficients I report are
the ones that apply to the Latin American countries. Finally, I re-
port OLS growth regressions and BMA analogues using only Latin
American countries in columns 5 and 6. Columns 3 and 5, in prin-
ciple, should be identical; differences here are second-order and re-
flect computational differences.
From the perspective of inferences about policy variables, the re-
sults of this exercise are mixed, in the sense that the conclusions one
would draw from the BMA exercises are not systematically different
from those that would be drawn from the OLS exercise. Nevertheless,
there are some noteworthy differences. Perhaps the biggest difference
concerns the SURP variable (see table 1). If one compares the esti-
mates in columns 1 and 4 for this variable, one sees that the point
estimate declines by about 30 percent and the standard error increases
by about 30 percent when one engages in a BMA exercise that allows
for both theory uncertainty and country heterogeneity. The exercise
thus seems to undermine the evidence that this policy variable can be
used to affect growth. Interestingly, the reason why the evidence is
weakened is not simply that this analysis allows the Latin American
countries to have different parameters than the rest of the world. As
column 3 indicates, an application of BMA that only allows for theory
uncertainty gives very similar results.
The impact of schooling on growth also exhibits some sensitivity to
accounting for model uncertainty. Interestingly, this sensitivity is not
uniform across alternative formulations. The posterior mean and stan-
dard deviation of the schooling parameter are quite similar when one com-
pares columns 1 and 4, but they exhibit variations elsewhere. In particu-180 Steven N. Durlauf
Table 1. Government Deficit: Ordinary Least Squares versus
Bayesian Model Averaginga
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept term — — — —  –0.9084  –0.0333
— — — —  (0.3869)  (0.2305)
Dummy for  –0.0150  –0.0157  –0.0148  –0.0155 — —
sub-Saharan Africa  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0045)  (0.0044) — —
Dummy for Latin America  –0.0180  –0.0187  –0.8014  –0.0124 — —
and the Caribbean  (0.0037)  (0.0038)  (0.4425)  (0.0098) — —
Dummy for 1960s  –0.1428  0.0003  –0.1070  –0.0001 — —
 (0.0831)  (0.0027)  (0.0863)  (0.0008) — —
Dummy for 1970s  –0.1388  0.0008  –0.1035  0.0008  0.0034 —
 (0.0829)  (0.0032)  (0.0866)  (0.0028)  (0.0060) —
Dummy for 1980s  –0.1539  –0.0134  –0.1259  –0.0141  –0.0190  –0.0261
 (0.0828)  (0.0040)  (0.0867)  (0.0034)  (0.0068)  (0.0054)
Log of initial income  0.0559  0.0193  0.2446  0.0184  0.2446  0.0162
 (0.0215)  (0.0023)  (0.1108)  (0.0026)  (0.0987)  (0.0594)
Log of initial income  –0.0041  –0.0017  –0.0160  –0.0017  –0.0160  –0.0011
squared  (0.0014)  (0.0003)  (0.0071)  (0.0003)  (0.0063)  (0.0038)
Assassinations  –12.771  –0.6515  –22.1548  –0.8421  –22.1548  –4.8753
 (9.6661)  (3.4941)  (11.4928)  (3.9877)  (10.2465)  (9.1183)
Financial depth  0.0164  0.0114  0.0329  0.0113  0.0329  –0.0003
 (0.0059)  (0.0085)  (0.0260)  (0.0086)  (0.0231)  (0.0060)
Black market premium  –0.0204  –0.0226  –0.0133  –0.0221  –0.0133  –0.0090
 (0.0044)  (0.0045)  (0.0086)  (0.0047)  (0.0077)  (0.0099)
Ethnic diversity (ELF60)  –0.0189  –0.0208  –0.0019  –0.0201  –0.0019  –0.0016
 (0.0054)  (0.0055)  (0.0121)  (0.0064)  (0.0108)  (0.0057)
Fiscal surplus/GDP (SURP)  0.102  0.0775  0.1207  0.0792  0.1208  0.0458
 (0.0305)  (0.0417)  (0.0666)  (0.0401)  (0.0593)  (0.0573)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Easterly and Levine (1997).
a. The estimated regressions are as follows: (1) ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for model ALL; (2) Bayesian
model averaging (BMA) estimates for model ALL; (3) OLS estimates for model ALL + ALL*I(LATINCA), for which
composite coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported and in which AFRICA, LATINCA, and DUM60
are dropped from the LATINCA-specific set of regressors; (4) BMA estimates for model ALL + ALL*I(LATINCA),
for which composite coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported and in which AFRICA, LATINCA, and
DUM60 are dropped from the LATINCA-specific set of regressors; (5) OLS on LATINCA subsample; and (6) BMA
on LATINCA subsample. Standard errors are in parentheses.
lar, when BMA is applied to the Latin American countries in isolation
(column 6), the posterior expected value of the schooling coefficient is less
than half as large as the OLS estimate, with a much larger standard
error as well. I am not sure how to interpret this finding.
Table 3 examines democracy and growth. This table fails to pick up
any particularly interesting differences in the various democracy esti-181 Policy Evaluation and Empirical Growth Research
Table 2. Schooling: Ordinary Least Squares versus Bayesian
Model Averaginga
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept term — — — — –0.7425 –0.0991
— — — — (0.3837)  (0.3260)
Dummy for –0.0144 –0.0160 –0.0146 –0.0159 — —
sub- Saharan Africa (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0043) — —
Dummy for Latin America –0.0187 –0.0203 –0.6480 –0.0169 — —
and the Caribbean (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.4088) (0.0136) — —
Dummy for 1960s –0.1480 –0.00005 –0.0944 — — —
(0.0813) (0.00072) (0.0863) — — —
Dummy for 1970s –0.1472 0.00004 –0.0892 0.0016 0.0052 0.0004
(0.0814) (0.00070) (0.0865) (0.0041) (0.0059) (0.0022)
Dummy for 1980s –0.1630 –0.0152 –0.1146 –0.0155 –0.0201 –0.0259
(0.0814) (0.0027) (0.0866) (0.0035) (0.0069) (0.0059)
Log of initial income 0.0565 0.0190 0.1991 0.0184 0.1991 0.0316
(0.0207) (0.0022) (0.1019) (0.0029) (0.0978) (0.0837)
Log of initial income –0.0044 –0.0019 0.0131 –0.0019 –0.0131 –0.0021
squared (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0064) (0.0003) (0.0062) (0.0053)
Assassinations –14.5187 –1.2223 –17.6708 –1.849 –17.6707 –5.8233
(9.1125) (4.6371) (11.2981) (5.7521) (10.8444) (9.9402)
Financial depth 0.0135 0.0072 0.0024 0.0073 0.0024 –0.0008
(0.0055) (0.0077) (0.0196) (0.0081) (0.0188) (0.0055)
Black market premium –0.0230 –0.0242 –0.0191 –0.0240 –0.0192 –0.0129
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0076) (0.0039) (0.0073) (0.0096)
Ethnic diversity (ELF60) –0.0160 –0.0194 –0.0079 –0.0191 –0.0079 –0.0010
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0112) (0.0057) (0.0108) (0.0045)
Log of SCHOOLING 0.0120 0.0107 0.0107 0.0114 0.0107 0.0018
(0.0037) (0.0047) (0.0104) (0.0048) (0.0100) (0.0053)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Easterly and Levine (1997).
a. The estimated regressions are as follows: (1) ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for model ALL; (2)
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) estimates for model ALL; (3) OLS estimates for model ALL + ALL*I(LATINCA),
for which composite coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported and in which AFRICA, LATINCA,
and DUM60 are dropped from the LATINCA-specific set of regressors; (4) BMA estimates for model ALL +
ALL*I(LATINCA), for which composite coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported and in which
AFRICA, LATINCA, and DUM60 are dropped from the LATINCA-specific set of regressors; (5) OLS on LATINCA
subsample; and (6) BMA on LATINCA subsample. Standard errors are in parentheses.
mates, in that the posterior expectation in each case is quite small
when compared with the variance. The consistency of this finding across
the estimated alternatives, however, strengthens arguments that de-
mocracy levels do not seem to add much to empirical models of growth.7
7. Compare Barro (1996).182 Steven N. Durlauf
Finally, the tables generally reveal substantial differences for pa-
rameter estimates for Latin America versus the world as a whole. This
strongly suggests that in using growth regressions to inform policy in
Latin America, one must be very cautious in drawing generalizations
from standard empirical exercises and applying them to Latin America.
This finding is not unique; Brock and Durlauf (2001) draw similar
conclusions with respect to countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 3. Democracy: Ordinary Least Squares versus
Bayesian Model Averaginga
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept term — — — — –0.7667 0.0083
— — — — (0.4894)  (0.1529)
Dummy for –0.0168 –0.0161 –0.0160 –0.0162 — —
sub-Saharan Africa (0.0047) (0.0073) (0.0049) (0.0061) — —
Dummy for Latin –0.0150 –0.0138 –0.6866 –0.0027 — —
America and the (0.0045) (0.0070) (0.5295) (0.0063) — —
Caribbean
Dummy for 1970s –0.0949 0.0464 –0.0801 0.0467 — —
(0.0890) (0.0155) (0.0928) (0.0146) — —
Dummy for 1980s –0.1111 0.0293 –0.1052 0.0262 –0.0252 –0.0276
(0.0890) (0.0167) (0.0930) (0.0170) (0.0062) (0.0063)
Log of initial income 0.0423 –0.0001 0.2045 –0.0006 0.2045 0.0059
(0.0231) (0.0006) (0.1304) (0.0013) (0.1224)  (0.0389)
Log of initial income –0.0032 –0.0001 –0.0131 –0.0002 –0.0131 –0.0004
squared (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0082) (0.0002) (0.0077) (0.0025)
Assassinations –19.2393 –4.0676 –18.5783 –3.1335 –18.5783 –6.2317
(10.3025) (9.2535) (12.4481) (8.2420) (11.6849) (10.5951)
Financial depth 0.0172 0.0103 0.00780 0.0006 0.0079 –0.0019
(0.0068) (0.0115) (0.0233) (0.0187) (0.0219) (0.0087)
Black market premium –0.0207 –0.0205 –0.0197 –0.0201 –0.0197 –0.0137
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0087) (0.0047) (0.0081) (0.0100)
Ethnic diversity (ELF60) –0.0136 –0.0080 –0.0143 –0.0085 –0.0143 –0.0054
(0.0059) (0.0085) (0.0148) (0.0097) (0.0140) (0.0112)
DEMOCRACY –0.0008 –0.000003 0.0005 — 0.0006 0.00003
(0.0009) (0.000190)(0.0018) — (0.0016) (0.00037)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Easterly and Levine (1997).
a. The estimated regressions are as follows: (1) ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for model ALL; (2) Bayesian
model averaging (BMA) estimates for model ALL; (3) OLS estimates for model ALL + ALL*I(LATINCA), for
which composite coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported and in which AFRICA, LATINCA, and
(LATINCA*DUM70) are dropped from LATINCA-specific set of regressors; (4) BMA estimates for model ALL
+ ALL*I(LATINCA), for which composite coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported and in which
AFRICA, LATINCA, and (LATINCA*DUM70) are dropped from LATINCA-specific set of regressors; the de-
mocracy variable is included in set of regressors, but never picked up by BMA procedure. (5) OLS on LATINCA
subsample; and (6) BMA on LATINCA subsample. Standard errors are in parentheses. No democracy data are
available for the 1960s period, so DUM60 was dropped.183 Policy Evaluation and Empirical Growth Research
5. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper was to argue that the conventional use
of empirical studies of growth to inform policy suffers from a number of
problems, which may be defined on two levels. First, the use of statis-
tical significance levels to determine which policy instruments affect
growth and which do not is an unsatisfactory basis for integrating
empirical work and policy evaluation. Policy evaluation is better thought
of as a comparison of posterior distributions of growth rates for a given
country under alternative policy scenarios. This comparison can only
be made relative to the payoff function of the policymaker. Statistical
significance levels correspond to this comparison only for very special
cases. Second, in assessing posterior distributions of growth rates, con-
ventional growth regressions suffer from a number of limitations. These
regressions typically do not allow for the fact that an empirical re-
searcher does not know the true growth model. Model uncertainty, in
this context, occurs because the modeler does not know what growth
determinants must be included in a model or what forms of country-
level heterogeneity need to be accounted for in the model. I follow Brock
and Durlauf (2001), Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2000), and
Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b) in advocating the use of Bayesian
model averaging methods to allow for the explicit incorporation of model
uncertainty in empirical work. A small empirical exercise illustrates
how the use of growth regressions to draw policy implications for Latin
American countries is affected by allowing for model uncertainty.
To repeat, this paper should not be regarded as advocating nihilism
when it comes to econometric analyses of growth. Rather, it should be
read as advocating caution. Within the discourse of academic econom-
ics, far too much emphasis is placed on zero-one assessments of whether
a given theory is true. What is needed is a more nuanced approach to
empirical work that gives adequate scope to the limits on inferences
that can be made from observational data. Regressions have a role to
play in policy evaluations, even for phenomena as important as growth.
This role is distorted when a researcher ignores available historical and
cultural information about a given country when conducting statistical
work. Put differently, it is troubling how such deep qualitative studies
as Greenfield (2001) and Landes (1998) have had little integration into
the quantitative studies of growth that currently dominate the field.
The issues of the integration of econometrics with policy analysis
and the appropriate incorporation of model uncertainty into empirical
studies are by no means unique to the study of economic growth.184 Steven N. Durlauf
However, given the breadth of the phenomenon under study, as well as
the complexities of the units whose behavior is to be evaluated (after
all, we are dealing with the growth rates of entire economies), the study
of growth at a country-wide level seems particularly susceptible to these
problems. While there is no magic solution to the question of how to
integrate different sources and types of information into a coherent
policy exercise, such issues cannot be ignored. Ultimately, what is needed
is a full recognition of the difficulties and limits facing any judgments
that must be made in using data to inform growth policies.185 Policy Evaluation and Empirical Growth Research
APPENDIX A
The data cover 160 countries and include the following variables.
Code Description
GYP Growth rate of real per capita GDP. Source: World Bank National Accounts
(various years).
AFRICA Dummy variable for sub-Saharan African countries (according to World
Bank definition). Source: World Bank National Accounts for AGO, BDI,
BEN, BWA, CAF, CIV, CMR, COG, COM, CPV, DJI, ETH, GAB, GHA, GIN,
GMB, GNB, GNQ, HVO, KEN, LBR, LSO, MDG, MLI, MOZ, MRT, MUS, MWI,
NAM, NER, NGA, RWA, SDN, SEN, SLE, SOM, STP, SWZ, SYC, TCD, TGO,
TZA, UGA, ZAF, ZAR, ZMB, ZWE (various years).
ASSASS Number of assassinations per thousand population, decade average. Source:
Banks (1994).
BLCK Log of 1 plus black market premium, decade average. Source: World Bank
(1991, with updates); Pick’s Currency Yearbook (various years).
DUM60 Dummy variable for 1960s.
DUM70 Dummy variable for 1970s.
DUM80 Dummy variable for 1980s.
ELF60 Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 1960. Measures the probability
that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the
same ethnolinguistic group. Source: Easterly and Levine (1997); Atlas
Narodov Mira (1964).
LATINCA Dummy variable for Latin America and the Caribbean. Source: Easterly and
Levine (1997).
LLY Measure of financial depth, based on the ratio of the financial system’s
liquid liabilities to GDP, decade average. Liquid liabilities consist of
currency held outside the banking system plus demand and interest bearing
liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries. Source: King and
Levine (1993).
LRGDP Initial income, measured as the log of real per capita GDP at the start of
each decade (1960, 1970, 1980). Source: Summers and Heston (1988).
LRGDPSQ Log of initial real per capita GDP squared. Source: Summers and Heston
(1988).
DEMOC Measure of democracy (Gastil’s political rights variable) Source: Gastil
(1990, 1988).
LSCHOOL Log of 1 plus average years of school attainment, quinquennial values
(1960–1965, 1970–1975, and 1980–1985). Source: Barro and Lee (1993).
SURP Ratio of central government fiscal surplus to GDP, both in local currency at
current prices, decade average. Source: IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (various years, line 80) and Government Finance Statistics
(various years, line L80).186 Steven N. Durlauf
APPENDIX B
All model averaging calculations were done using the program
bicreg, which is an SPLUS program written by Adrian Raftery.8 The
key feature of the program is the way it deals with the large number of
regressions involved in a BMA exercise. This program, following stan-
dard procedures in the model averaging literature, uses a search algo-
rithm that explores only a subset of the model space; the design of the
algorithm ensures that the search proceeds along directions such that
it is likely to cover models that are relatively strongly supported by the
data. I follow the procedure suggested by Madigan and Raftery (1995);
see Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997) and Hoeting and others (1999)
for additional discussion and a full description of the search algorithm.
The latter paper provides a nice intuitive description of the ideas that
underlie the algorithm:
First, when the algorithm compares two nested models and deci-
sively rejects the simpler model, then all submodels of the simpler
model are rejected. The second idea, “Occam’s window,” concerns the
interpretation of the ratio of posterior model probabilities Pr(M0/D)/
Pr(M1/D). Here M0 is “smaller” than M1.… If there is evidence for M0
then M1 is rejected, but rejecting M0 requires strong evidence for the
larger model M1 (Hoeting and others, 1999, p. 385).
The algorithm I employ to implement the model averaging proce-
dure uses an approximation, following Raftery (1995), based on the idea
that for a large enough number of observations, the posterior coeffi-
cient distribution will be close to the maximum likelihood estimator,
such that one can use the maximum likelihood estimates to avoid the
need to specify a particular prior. Raftery (1995) and Tierney and Kadane
(1986) contain technical details. While some evidence exists that this
approximation works well in practice, more research is needed on the
specification of priors for model averaging. Fernandez, Ley, and Steel
(2001a) make an important contribution in this respect.
8. Available at www.research.att.com/~volinsky/bma.html.187 Policy Evaluation and Empirical Growth Research
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